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Security pass
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Greg Kilmer
+133
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@@ -189,7 +189,115 @@ The site applies a layered anti-scraping policy:
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---
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## 5. Updating the site
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## 5. Security headers & hardening
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Security is split between the app (version-controlled) and the reverse proxy
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(owns the TLS edge). This division keeps each part where it's strongest.
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### Set in the app — `src/middleware.ts`
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Every response carries these headers, applied by Astro middleware:
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| Header | Value | Purpose |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `Content-Security-Policy` | see file | Restricts script/style/font/img/connect/frame sources |
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| `X-Content-Type-Options` | `nosniff` | Blocks MIME-sniffing |
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| `X-Frame-Options` | `DENY` | Clickjacking (legacy browsers; CSP `frame-ancestors 'none'` covers modern ones) |
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| `Referrer-Policy` | `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` | Limits referrer leakage |
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| `Permissions-Policy` | `camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), interest-cohort=()` | Disables unused browser features |
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The CSP allows `'self'`, `'unsafe-inline'` (temporary — see below), and
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`https://challenges.cloudflare.com` (Cloudflare Turnstile, used only on
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`/contact`). All fonts, images, and styles are self-hosted, so nothing else
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needs an external origin.
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### Set at the reverse proxy (Nginx Proxy Manager)
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These belong at the proxy because they only make sense at the TLS edge, or
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because only the proxy can overwrite client-supplied headers:
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- **HTTP → HTTPS redirect** (Force SSL / `return 301 https://$host$request_uri`).
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- **`Strict-Transport-Security`** (HSTS) — ignored over HTTP, so the proxy must
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set it. Example: `max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains`. Leave `preload` off
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until you've run the site a while and confirmed all subdomains serve HTTPS.
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- **`X-Forwarded-For` overwrite** — **critical for the contact API's rate
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limiter.** Add to the proxy host's Custom Nginx Configuration:
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```nginx
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add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
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proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
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```
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The `X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr` line **overwrites** (not appends) any
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client-supplied value, closing a rate-limit bypass where an attacker spoofs
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a fresh IP per request. (`/api/contact` reads the first XFF hop as the
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client IP.)
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### CSRF — not applicable, intentionally
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The contact endpoint needs no CSRF token because none of the standard CSRF
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preconditions hold:
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- **No cookies or sessions** — there is no auth and no session state to forge
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against.
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- **JSON-only body** — the handler calls `request.json()`; a cross-origin form
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POST (the classic CSRF vector) sends form-encoded data, which fails JSON
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parsing and is rejected with 400 before any side effect.
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- **No CORS** — the endpoint has no permissive `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`,
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so a cross-origin `fetch` with JSON from a malicious site is blocked by the
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browser's same-origin policy unless the request is "simple" (a JSON POST
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with `Content-Type: application/json` is not simple and triggers a CORS
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preflight that fails).
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If any of these change (auth added, a form-encodable fallback, CORS opened),
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revisit CSRF here.
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### Rate-limiting caveats
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- The limiter in `/api/contact` is **per-worker** (in-memory). For a single
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container behind the proxy this is fine. If you ever scale to multiple
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replicas, swap the in-memory `Map` for Redis/Upstash so the limit is global.
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- The IP is taken from `X-Forwarded-For`, which is why the proxy XFF overwrite
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above matters.
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- The proxy can additionally rate-limit at the edge (`limit_req`) for defense
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before traffic reaches Node. Optional — the app already limits.
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### Dependency hygiene
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There is no CI pipeline; deploys are manual. Before each deploy, run:
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```bash
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npm audit # report known vulns in the dependency tree
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npm audit --omit=dev # production deps only
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npm outdated # check for behind-version packages
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```
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Address any `high`/`critical` audit findings before building. `npm update`
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within the caret ranges in `package.json` is safe between full upgrades.
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### `/.well-known/security.txt`
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A [RFC 9116](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9116) security contact lives at
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`public/.well-known/security.txt`, served at
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`https://gregkilmer.com/.well-known/security.txt`. It points to
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`security@gregkilmer.com` and expires ~1 year out — **renew the `Expires:`
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date before it passes**, or vulnerability reporters' tools will flag it as
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stale.
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### Future: tighten CSP with nonces (deferred)
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`script-src` currently includes `'unsafe-inline'` because two inline scripts
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in `BaseLayout.astro` (the theme-init boot and the View Transitions
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flash-killer) can't be nonce-tagged without restructuring how they're emitted.
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The next step is to generate a per-request nonce in `src/middleware.ts`, inject
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it onto those two scripts in `BaseLayout.astro`, and replace `'unsafe-inline'`
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with `'nonce-<value>'` in `script-src`. Astro View Transitions can complicate
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nonce propagation across the client-side swap, so this is its own task — the
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file header in `src/middleware.ts` tracks it.
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---
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## 6. Updating the site
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```bash
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git pull
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@@ -201,7 +309,7 @@ the new artifact with zero config.
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---
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## 6. Without Docker (bare Node)
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## 7. Without Docker (bare Node)
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If you prefer to run Node directly on the host:
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@@ -212,3 +320,26 @@ HOST=0.0.0.0 PORT=4321 SITE_URL=https://gregkilmer.com node ./dist/server/entry.
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```
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Run it under a process manager (systemd, pm2) so it restarts on crash/boot.
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---
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## 8. Verifying security headers after deploy
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```bash
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# App-set headers (from src/middleware.ts)
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curl -sI https://gregkilmer.com | grep -iE 'content-security|x-frame|x-content|referrer|permissions'
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# Proxy-set HSTS + redirect (Nginx Proxy Manager)
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curl -sI https://gregkilmer.com | grep -i 'strict-transport'
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curl -sI http://gregkilmer.com # expect 301 -> https://
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# security.txt reachable
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curl -s https://gregkilmer.com/.well-known/security.txt
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```
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All five app headers (`content-security-policy`, `x-frame-options`,
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`x-content-type-options`, `referrer-policy`, `permissions-policy`) should be
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present on every route, including `/api/contact`. The `strict-transport-
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security` header should appear only on the HTTPS response, and the plain-HTTP
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request should redirect.
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